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Until recently, U.S. corn exports 
destined for Canada faced a $1.65-
per-bushel tax. This tax, or import 
tariff, was Canada’s response to 
claims made by Canadian corn 
farmers that they are the victims of 
subsidized and dumped U.S. corn. 
The Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal just ruled against the im-
port tariff. 
The claim of injury to Cana-
dian corn producers was based on 
the notion that U.S. corn farmers 
consistently sell their corn for less 
than it costs to produce it. That 
is, cheap U.S. corn is “dumped” 
in Canada. It was further argued 
that the reason why corn farm-
ers can sell for such a low price 
and remain in business is that U.S. 
subsidies keep them afl oat. Im-
plicit in this argument is that if U.S. 
corn subsidies were eliminated, 
then U.S. corn production would 
decrease and the U.S. and Cana-
dian prices of corn would increase. 
This story is certainly consistent 
with many arguments made in the 
United States by supporters of U.S. 
farm programs. For example, Hem-
bree Brandon writes in the Delta 
Farm Press:
They [farm payments] really 
are a food subsidy assistance 
in disguise, and he [Ken Cook] 
and every person in this 
county (sic) who buys food 
and eats three squares a day 
are benefi ciaries of it—U.S. citi-
zens pay far less for food than 
anyone on the planet.  They are 
also a food security subsidy in 
disguise. God help the U.S. if it 
becomes as dependent on off-
shore food as it is offshore oil. 
(December 10, 2004)
Implicit in Mr. Brandon’s argu-
ment is that U.S. farm production 
would decline without U.S. farm 
payments, with resulting increases 
in commodity and food prices. 
The argument by Canada that 
their producers are harmed by low 
prices resulting from U.S. corn sub-
sidies is similar to Brazil’s argument 
made in their World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) dispute against the U.S. 
cotton program. Brazil successfully 
made the case that cotton payments 
increased U.S. production and low-
ered world prices to the detriment 
of Brazilian cotton producers. The 
WTO panel ruled that the United 
States needed to eliminate its export 
subsidy program, called Step 2, and 
it needed to eliminate programs that 
increase production and suppress 
world prices. 
What does all of this portend for 
U.S. corn farmers? If U.S. farm pro-
grams really are a “cheap food” policy 
in disguise, then Canadian corn farm-
ers would seem to have a valid argu-
ment that they have been harmed by 
U.S. subsidies. Is this argument valid? 
If so, then is the U.S. corn program as 
vulnerable to a negative WTO panel 
ruling as was cotton? 
Farm Programs and Cheap Food
U.S. farmers often justify farm 
program payments by linking the 
payments to the small share of U.S. 
disposable income that is spent on 
food. Those who make this linkage 
attribute high productivity and high 
production at the farm level to pro-
gram payments. The availability of 
less-expensive raw ingredients then 
decreases production costs of food 
processors and manufacturers, lead-
ing to lower food prices. If this story 
is true, then a removal of farm pro-
gram payments should lead to higher 
food prices. Logically, the largest 
increases should show up in food 
products in which currently subsi-
dized raw ingredients (corn, wheat, 
or soybeans) make up the largest 
share of total production costs.
A reasonable formula for approx-
imating how the price of a food item 
would change because of a change 
in the price of a raw ingredient is to 
multiply the percent change in the 
price of the raw ingredient by the 
share of the price of the food item 
that is represented by the cost of the 
raw ingredient. For example, corn 
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represents perhaps 38 percent of   
the cost of producing a market-ready 
hog. The cost of a market-ready hog 
represents 28 percent of the fi nal 
retail price of pork. This means that 
corn represents approximately 10.64 
percent of the retail price of pork. 
Suppose that the removal of 
farm programs caused the price of 
corn to increase by 5 percent. The 
price of pork would then increase 
by about 0.53 percent. That is, pork 
chops that cost $3.00 per pound 
with farm subsidies would increase 
in price by less than two cents per 
pound. If corn prices were to rise by 
10 percent with the removal of sub-
sidies, then pork chops would cost 
only three cents per pound more 
than they currently do. Because 
corn represents a smaller share 
of the fi nal value of beef and dairy 
products, retail prices for these 
products would go up by a smaller 
amount (in percentage terms) than 
the price of pork.
It is diffi cult to come up with 
examples in which subsidized U.S. 
commodities have a greater than 10 
percent share of fi nal retail value. 
And at this maximum share, it 
would take a doubling of commod-
ity prices to increase consumer 
prices by 10 percent. But no cred-
ible analyst has ever estimated 
that farm payments result in such 
a large supply expansion that their 
withdrawal would cause commodity 
prices to double. The idea that U.S. 
commodity policy is really a cheap 
food policy is a myth.
Supporters of farm programs 
who incorrectly justify them as pro-
viding cheap food to U.S. consumers 
should realize that they are pro-
viding ready ammunition to those 
countries who want to attack U.S. 
farm subsidies as being harmful to 
their domestic producers. After all, 
U.S. and world prices move togeth-
er because the commodities that 
receive U.S. subsidies are widely 
traded on international markets. If 
farm payments reduce U.S. prices, 
then they also reduce world prices, 
which means that farmers around 
the world are hurt by U.S. farm pay-
ments. Given the very large com-
modity price changes that would be 
required for a cheap food policy to 
be a reality, does use of this ratio-
nale for U.S. farm programs really 
serve U.S. producer interests?
A concrete example of how 
this type of argument can be used 
against U.S. producer interests is 
the compelling argument that Bra-
zil used in the cotton case that was 
obtained directly from supporters 
of the U.S. cotton program. In testi-
mony about the impacts of stricter 
payment limits, supporters of lax 
payment limits argued that strict-
er payment limits would cause a 
signifi cant decrease in U.S. cotton 
production. Put another way, cot-
ton payments cause cotton acreage 
to increase, which is exactly what 
Brazil was arguing.
Do U.S. Subsidies Decrease 
Commodity Prices?
Even if farm subsidies do not lead 
to cheap food, they can lead to 
cheap commodities, which poten-
tially makes U.S. farm programs 
vulnerable to further WTO panel 
judgments.
One of the key lessons of Eco-
nomics 101 is that it is a simple 
matter for government to get more 
of anything it wants: simply sub-
sidize its production. Although 
fi nal 2005 payments have not yet 
been determined, payments to 
U.S. corn producers are expected 
to average 26.7 percent of market 
revenue over the three crop years 
2003, 2004, and 2005. Total corn 
payments over these three years 
are expected to be $20.5 billion. 
Experts supporting Canada’s posi-
tion in the ongoing corn tariff case 
point to this 26.7 percent subsidy 
rate as prima facie evidence that 
U.S. corn payments increase pro-
duction, thereby lowering world 
corn prices. But, as is so often the 
case, reality is more complicated 
than a simple application of a les-
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son learned in an introductory eco-
nomics course.
The fi rst nuance is that 31 per-
cent of U.S. corn payments over this 
period (direct payments) are specifi -
cally designed not to infl uence U.S. 
corn plantings. These payments do 
not depend on prices, production lev-
els, acreage levels, or even whether 
farmers plant a crop. The one re-
striction is that farmers cannot plant 
fruits, tree nuts, or vegetables on land 
that qualifi es for these payments. 
This “fruit and vegetable exclusion” 
is relatively unimportant for corn, 
because the majority of corn land is 
best suited for feed grain production. 
If we remove direct payments from 
the calculations, then corn payments 
drop to 18.5 percent of market rev-
enue—still a large number.
The second nuance we need 
to account for is that 43 percent of 
the payments remaining after direct 
payments are removed are also de-
signed to have minimal infl uence on 
planting decisions. Farmers cannot 
change the size of countercyclical 
payments for corn by changing acre-
age or production levels, so these 
payments provide no direct incen-
tive to plant more corn when mar-
ket prices are expected to be low. 
However, countercyclical payments 
increase when market prices drop, 
so they do provide some price pro-
tection to farmers. Thus, although 
nobody knows for sure, most econo-
mists believe that these payments 
provide some incentive for farmers 
to plant corn. Analysts with the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute assume that $10.00 of ex-
pected countercyclical payments 
per acre provides the same produc-
tion incentive as $2.50 of expected 
market revenue. Accordingly, if we 
remove 75 percent of countercyclical 
payments, then corn payments drop 
to 11.7 percent of market revenue—
still a signifi cant number but fast 
becoming less signifi cant.
bumper crops are unexpected. Thus, 
the size of the payments that arrived 
was also unexpected. An additional 
surprise factor in 2005 was the large 
and negative impact of Hurricane Ka-
trina on local prices at harvest time. 
Most corn farmers took advantage 
of these low prices to lock in large 
windfall payments. Thus, we also need 
to reduce the 11.7 percent payment 
rate by the degree of “surprise” before 
we can conclude that U.S. commodity 
programs signifi cantly changed farm-
ers’ acreage decisions.
This discussion is not an attempt 
to minimize the impacts of U.S. farm 
subsidies on farmers’ acreage deci-
sions. Rather, it is meant to illustrate 
how complicated estimation of the 
impacts actually is. Farmers base 
their decisions about what and how 
much to plant on numerous factors, 
including rotation considerations, 
production costs, expected market 
prices, availability of crop insurance, 
and expected benefi ts from farm 
programs. The complicated nature 
of these decisions makes it quite 
diffi cult to determine if U.S. farm 
programs for crops other than cotton 
are vulnerable to a WTO case against 
them on the basis of price suppres-
sion. The role that these programs 
play in farmers’ planting decisions 
varies across crops, regions, and 
crop years. Simple “rules of thumb” 
that use total payment levels as a 
guide or the belief that the programs 
work as a cheap food policy are 
inadequate measures of the impacts 
of farm payments on U.S. supply and 
international commodity prices. ◆
Note of Disclosure: Professor Babcock 
was an expert witness testifying for a 
major Canadian corn importer in the 
inquiry by the Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal. In addition, he pro-
vided modeling assistance in 2003 to 
Professor Daniel Sumner, who was an 
expert witness for Brazil in the cotton 
case. 
Supporters of farm 
programs who 
incorrectly justify them 
as providing cheap 
food to U.S. consumers 
should realize that they 
are providing ready 
ammunition to those 
countries who want to 
attack U.S. farm 
subsidies as being 
harmful to their 
domestic producers.
There is near unanimity among 
economists that increases in ex-
pected marketing loan gains and 
loan defi ciency payments will 
increase planted acreage because 
they are paid on all current produc-
tion. However, it would be a mistake 
simply to conclude that farmers 
increased corn acreage from 2003 
to 2005 because farmers expected 
an 11.7 percent average boost in 
revenue from corn payments. We 
have to look at market conditions at 
the time that farmers decide what 
to plant to determine the infl uence 
of the programs.
As previously discussed in this 
publication, producers obtain the 
largest benefi t from the current set 
of farm programs in bumper-crop/
low-price years. We had back-to-back 
bumper crops in 2004 and 2005, with 
2004 being the largest increase over 
trend yields in history. By defi nition, 
